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Abstract 
This article investigates the institutional makeup of the Institute of International Finance (IIF), a 
worldwide advocacy group representing the private financial sector. The goal is to find out 
whether or not the IIF is subject to first-order capture: a process in which a small group of 
members within the organization have become the dominant powers within the larger 
organization. First-Order capture is closely related to regulatory capture, which has long been a 
subject of interest amongst scholars in the field of international political economy. Through a 
study of the bylaws of the IIF, the article finds that there is indeed a group within the IIF’s 
membership ranks, which holds an institutional advantage, which allows them to take over the 
direction of the IIF.  
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Introduction 
In this article, I will investigate the concept of first-order capture in the financial sector, 
specifically targeting the Institute of International Finance (hereafter: IIF). The IIF is a 
transnational actor representing the interests of, as the IIF’s article of incorporation puts it, “any 
lending institution which has, or proposes to have within the immediate future, international 
exposure as a result of holding international loans in its portfolio for its own risk” (Nash 1983: 
575). In other words, membership to the IIF is open to any financial institution that plays a role 
in international finance. It is within this world of international finance, and the academic 
literature studying it, where the central concept of regulatory capture is encountered. Though the 
finer details of regulatory capture will be discussed at length later on, regulatory capture can be 
quickly summarized as an effective takeover of regulatory organizations by the private sector.  
This article argues that in addition to some degree of regulatory capture, the advocacy networks 
within the financial sector are subject to first-order capture. First-order capture, in short, is the 
takeover of a private representative body by a small number of its members. This means that the 
decision-making process within the organization is dominated by a collective within the 
organization, rather than by the organization as a whole. With regards to the IIF, this would 
mean that a small group of banks controls the direction of the IIF. Taking that idea to its logical 
conclusion, if both first-order and regulatory capture are in effect it would mean that a small 
number of banks have the ability to greatly influence international financial regulation.  
 
The credit crunch of 2007-8 set in motion a financial crisis that still rages on today. In many 
ways, the crisis has galvanized political figures to become more actively involved in financial 
regulation, even going so far as calling for a dramatic reconsideration of all current financial 
regulation (Helleiner 2010). Exploring regulatory capture, and by extension first-order capture, 
can identify possible issues with revamping regulation. It can also serve as a warning against 
allowing regulatory responsibilities to become too far removed from democratic oversight; since 
much of the influence the private sector had in the past was due to the technocratic character of 
the regulatory organizations (Helleiner & Pigliari 2011). The implications of regulatory and first-
order capture working back to back to influence the process of regulation could have far-reaching 
implications: in extremis, it could result in a situation where the rules of international finance 
may ultimately serve the interests of a small group of extremely wealthy financial institutions.  
 
Using the IIF’s own bylaws, their 2012 annual report, and the quarter-centennial review 
published in 2007, I will argue the IIF is indeed subject to first-order capture. I will do this by first 
examining the voting system as put in place by the bylaws of the IIF, followed by a look at the 
end result of this voting system by investigating the origins of the IIF’s current Board of 
Directors. After that, the implications of the results will be discussed. Finally, a brief discussion 
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of the placement of the concept of first-order capture within the theory of international norm 
dynamics will conclude my argument. The goal of my investigation is two-headed: first and 
foremost, to answer the central research question regarding the possibility of first-order capture of 
the IIF. Second, to provide a general idea of what first-order capture entails by providing a clear 
example of it. This will allow the concept to be used to analyse other advocacy networks, 
transnational actors, or lobby groups.  
 
Theoretical framework 
Regulatory capture, its extent and its impact on the regulatory and practical architecture of the 
contemporary financial world is crucial to my argument. Though literature about the subject in 
the context of political science was sparse pre-2007, regulatory capture has attracted growing 
attention from the political science community since the global financial crisis of 2007-8 came to 
pass (Helleiner & Pigliari 2011). However, the mechanics of regulatory capture are hardly ever 
discussed in the literature, authors instead tend to focus on what they perceive to be the results of 
the capture and what those results mean for the regulatory process. According to Young, the 
reason scholars have thus far failed to accurately map the way regulatory processes are 
influenced, is directly related to the “overstated and misleading” notion of wholesale purchase of 
the regulator by the financial sector (2012: 664). Similarly, there is hardly any literature available 
that provides an active way to prevent regulatory capture for occurring.  
  
The main subject of this article, however, is the concept of first-order capture, which is, 
essentially, the precursor of regulatory capture. Before going into more detail about the two types 
of capture, I will first discuss the way normative change comes about. This is necessary, because 
understanding how the process of capture impacts the process of normative change makes it 
possible for the findings of this article to be applied outside the realm of financial regulation.  
In their 1998 article International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, Martha Finnemore 
and Kathryn Sikkink present their life cycle model of normative change. The way a new norm 
emerges follows a three-stage structure, which goes from emergence through a so-called ‘cascade’ 
stage, and finally internalization (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998: 895-6). In the first stage, a norm 
entrepreneur sets in motion the emergence of a new norm, once in motion, this new norm gains 
momentum until a tipping point is reached, after which the cascade stage begins. In the cascade 
stage, the new norm gains momentum and quickly gains acceptance by an increasing amount of 
relevant actors. Finnemore and Sikkink argue that because of the logic of appropriateness, the 
norm is able to spread very quickly (1998: 895, 902-3). The process of socialization described in 
the article details how conforming to the cascading norm basically trumps individual interests. In 
other words, the logic of consequence, in which an actor makes an individual decision based on 
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his own interests, is overruled by the logic of appropriateness, which drives actors to conform to 
the larger structure around them.  
 With regards to the financial sector, the norm life cycle model applies in a peculiar way: 
the final product of the regulatory process, the rules for international finance, does not come 
about in a top-down way. In his article Neoliberalism and the new international financial architecture 
(2012), Aaron Major describes the process of regulation as a collaborative effort between the 
regulators and the private sector. Thus, rather than regulations being imposed on the sector, the 
regulations tend to be a codification of what both sides of the process find reasonable. In terms of 
the norm life cycle model, by the time the rules are put in place, the norms those rules set forth 
have already been accepted by the actors subject to them. The way regulatory capture interferes 
with the model as proposed by Finnemore and Sikkink is quite interesting: rather than being 
regulated and having to conform according to the logic of appropriateness, the private sector is 
able to influence the regulators in first stage, when the norm itself is still subject to change. I will 
go into more detail about the effects of regulatory capture on the norm life cycle model later in 
this article.  
 
The concept of first-order capture explores a precursor to regulatory capture, focusing on the 
decision-making process within the actor responsible for advocating a norm. One way this 
decision-making process might be impacted is by what Ranjit Lall terms the first-mover 
advantage (2012: 616). In the analytical framework he presents in his article From Failure to 
Failure, Lall includes a temporal dimension previously ignored by scholars. This added 
dimension allows him to establish timing as a vital factor in impacting the decision-making 
process: the party with the best access to the regulator was able to frame the coming regulations 
in a way that served that party’s goals best (Lall 2012: 632-3). Lall applies his framework to 
regulatory capture, specifically addressing the relation between the banking sector and the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), who are in charge of regulating international 
finance. However, I expect his framework to be equally applicable to the relation between the IIF 
and its member organizations. For instance, the bylaws of the IIF themselves are an example of a 
first-mover advantage in action. The bylaws were first put in place by the founding members of 
the IIF, a group consisting of 38 internationally operating banks from ten economically very 
advanced countries (IIF 2007: 177-8). According to the first-mover advantage, this would mean 
these 38 banks have had a distinct institutional advantage over all members who’ve joined since 
then.  
 Lall’s article also highlights an important aspect of international financial regulation, 
which he considers a prime example of regulatory capture in progress, the so-called Advanced 
Internal Ratings-based approach (or A-IRB). In addition to being a good example of regulatory 
capture, the A-IRB approach will be used in this article as an example of first-order capture as 
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well. The A-IRB approach would allow for certain larger banks to use their own models or risk-
assessment rather than the standardized model provided by the BCBS. The main reason the 
larger banks would be in favour of the this approach is because their own rating systems would be 
more forgiving when it comes to assessing the risks of an investment, thus allowing A-IRB 
capable banks to take bigger risks than banks who use the standardized system offered by the 
BCBS (Lall 2012: 613). Thus the implementation of the A-IRB approach into international 
financial regulation exemplifies successful regulatory as well as first-order capture, since “the 
introduction of internal ratings would also give the largest banks a substantial competitive 
advantage over smaller rivals” (Lall 2012: 613). In other words, the lobbying industry groups, 
who were captured by the A-IRB banks within their ranks, captured the regulators.  
 
Finally, there is the relationship between the advocacy group and the regulatory agency. In the 
case of the IIF and the BCBS, the relationship is frequently described as one in which the 
expertise and resources of the private sector allows them a great deal of access to the regulators 
(Young 2012, Lall 2012). This type of relationship between an advocacy group and a regulator, in 
which the advocacy group is able to trade information for more intimate access to the regulators, 
is not exclusive to the financial sector: Adam W. Chalmers details a similar relationship that 
exists between the European Union (EU) and certain advocacy networks, describing information 
as the currency of lobbying within the EU (2013: 39). In the case of the financial sector, where 
the regulatory agencies are more technocratic than they are in the EU, the level of access 
provided by the expertise of the private sector has led to a situation where the private sector has 
gained a first-mover advantage (Helleiner & Pigliari 2011, Lall 2012).  
 
Research Questions 
As stated in the introduction, this article addresses the question whether or not the Institute of 
International Finance is subject to first-order capture. First-order capture is closely related to 
regulatory capture, which has returned to the forefront of political science and international 
economic literature since the start of the financial and economic crisis in 2007. The idea of 
regulatory capture is hardly new: Nobel Prize winning economist George Stigler was one of the 
first authors to write about the subject in 1971 in his influential article the Economic Theory of 
Regulation. Stigler identified the industry (Stigler’s example was the petroleum industry) as the 
entity seeking regulation, for it could then use the coercive power of the state to strengthen the 
position of the existing players and limit the number of new players entering the fray (1971: 393).  
In his 2012 article, Major finds that due to a process of both de- and reregulation, the 
global financial framework has been reformed into an architecture that served to allow private-
sector banks to take greater risks for higher rewards (546-7). As a result, a system was put in place 
in which banks could take huge risks without it affecting the soundness of their balance sheets 
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(Major 2012: 548). Lall (2012) also discusses regulatory capture and its effects on the regulatory 
architecture of the international finance. Like Major, Lall finds that regulators and the sector 
have worked together to create a new regulatory infrastructure that fails to meet public demands 
for more risk-averse banking practices (Lall 2012: 632-3).  
 
In an article arguing against the prevalent idea that the agencies responsible for the regulation of 
the financial sector are subject to wholesale purchase by private sector interests, Kevin L. Young 
states “the character of the financial regulatory policy network at the time allowed transnational 
lobbyists to not only push their agenda, but to do so with close access to policymakers. 
[Regulators] certainly made use of information provided by banks, but this was more selective 
and inductive than wholesale purchase of private sector arguments” (2012: 681). Young’s 
argument does not dispute the existence of regulatory capture; he disagrees with the definition of 
regulatory capture that assumes a comprehensive takeover.  
In all these articles and many others (see: Underhill & Zhang 2008, Laffont & Tirole 
1993, Helleiner & Porter 2009), the banking sector is always treated as a united front, a single-
minded, monolithic entity. This article challenges that notion and asks if the transnational actor 
representing the financial sector has itself been captured by a relatively small group of banks. This 
first-order capture of the decision-making process within organizations has not yet been explored 
or investigated, which is what this article attempts to correct.   
 
Methods 
My investigation will rely mostly on sources provided by the IIF. I will build my argument 
through an institutional analysis of the IIF, using the reports and available information they 
provide on their website. The most important part of my argument will be based on an 
explorative look at the 2013 version of the IIF’s bylaws1 to discover how the IIF is governed and 
how the decision-making power is divided. The bylaws act as the organization’s rulebook, 
detailing how decisions are made, as well as providing a general framework for the organization’s 
leadership structure. In addition to the IIF’s bylaws, I will also make use of the bylaws of an 
organization similar to the IIF, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), 
whose bylaws are available online. Since the system the ISDA’s bylaws detail is quite different 
from the one used by the IIF, I will use the ISDA’s bylaws to compare and contrast the IIF 
bylaws. Although the ISDA is not the subject of any further analysis in this article, however their 
status as an organization similar to the IIF makes their bylaws a useful comparative tool to 
illustrate how a different approach to membership and voting rights yields different results.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  These bylaws are not publically available; they are only provided to (prospective) members of the organization and 
have been made available to the author by the IIF. 	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Table 1: Membership groups of the IIF2 
Group I Members with total assets > 200 billion dollars 
Group II Members with total assets between 100 and 200 billion dollars 
Group III Members with total assets between 50 and 100 billion dollars 
Group IV Members with total assets between 3 and 50 billion dollars 
Group V Members with total assets < 3 billion dollars 
 
 In addition to an institutional analysis of the IIF using the bylaws, attention will be 
devoted to the results of first-order capture, the viewpoints and advocacy goals of the captured 
transnational actors. To do this, I will devote some attention to the electoral end results of the 
IIF, specifically their Board of Directors.  
  
The first step of my investigation will be to analyse the institutional foundation of these 
transnational actors, to see if the major banks have an institutional advantage over smaller banks. 
Second, attention will be devoted to the individuals who sit on the Board of Directors for the IIF, 
since how they are elected and which members they represent. The IIF is the main focus of this 
article, since it is the major player when it comes to transnational organizations representing 
banks. Because of their status as the world’s only association for financial institutions, the 
approach I will be taking will take the shape of an institutional analysis of a particular actor on 
the global financial stage (the actor in question is the IIF). Using a multitude of sources and a 
number of examples of possible takeover, a general idea regarding the first-order capture of the 
IIF should emerge.  
 
Members  
In order to ascertain whether or not first-order capture has occurred within the IIF, this section 
will deal with the system of membership employed by the organization. In its bylaws, the IIF 
places its members in different groups based on the members’ total assets. The bylaws do not 
specify a reason for this grouping, though the intent seems to ensure the IIF can ask reasonable 
membership fees from its members. Five membership groups exist, each defined by the US dollar 
value of their total assets. Table 1 shows the definitions of the groups detailed in the IIF bylaws 
can be.  
 
Though the numbers seem very large it is important to note that the members are being 
categorized based on their total assets, which always makes for larger numbers. For many of the 
largest financial institutions the total assets go into the trillions of US dollars. Going into 2012, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Article III, Section 11 of the IIF bylaws (IIF 2013a) 
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the top 10 largest banks in the world all had total assets over 2 trillion dollars 3, and every bank 
listed on the top 10 of them are IIF members. However, the groups are not quite set in stone. 
Section 11 of Article III explicitly states that lower ranked members (placed by their total assets 
into Group II, for instance) can still move up to Group I, provided they “elect to become a group 
I member (…) by paying the membership dues (…) of a group I member” (IIF 2013a: 6). There is 
then, some upwards mobility possible when it comes to group membership and paying higher 
membership dues is permitted. The bylaws make no mention of downward mobility in any way, 
thus it is not possible for a member to pay less than what the IIF deems its fair share of the dues.  
 The division into groups merely indicates that the IIF differentiates its members in terms 
of their total assets. In and of itself, this is very logical. After all, IIF members include Deutsche 
Bank and their whopping $2,8 trillion in total assets, but at the same time it also includes the 
Golomt Bank of Mongolia, whose total assets in 2010 amounted to $1,1 billion 4. With 
membership so diverse in terms of wealth, it makes sense for the IIF to create some sort of system 
to ensure that smaller players can still join up without making the larger members’ dues 
disproportionately low. As the bylaws specify5, the Board of Directors annually decide the 
membership dues per fiscal year per group (IIF 2013a: 7). In addition to this ‘regular’ 
membership, an associate membership option is detailed6, which has separate membership fees 
and privileges7. Associate members enjoy full access to the IIF’s website and annual meetings, 
though the bylaws also state8 that they are not allowed to vote at the meetings (IIF 2013a: 4).  
According to the IIF’s website, ‘regular’ members are typically commercial banks and 
investment banks, as well as a growing number of insurance companies and investment 
management firms. Associate members are other financial companies: multinational 
corporations, trading companies, export credit agencies, and multilateral agencies (IIF 2013b: 59-
64). What this means is that though technically members of the IIF, associate members have no 
voice in the decision-making process, instead, they are given the role of the privileged guest who 
can build up a network and attend all the events organized by the IIF, but remain unable to make 
their voice heard directly by voting.  
 
As mentioned in article III, section 11 of the bylaws, it is possible for members of the IIF to jump 
in line and join a membership Group higher than their total assets would allow. The rules 
indicate specifically that member of Groups II or III can become members of groups I or II, 
respectively, simply by indicating they are willing to pay the higher membership dues that come 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 General Finance, August 27th 2012 www.gfmag.com/tools/best-banks/11986-worlds-50-biggest-banks-
2012.html#axzz2SQLVKtBP, accessed June 16th 2013 
4 Golomt Bank, 2011. http://www.golomtbank.com/uploads/users/2-admin/Annual_Report2010_eng.pdf , accessed 
June 16th 2013 
5 Article III, section 13, subsection b (IIF 2013a: 7) 
6 Article III, section 2 (IIF 2013a: 4) 
7 Article III, section 13, subsection c (IIF 2013a: 7) 
8 Article III, section 13, subsection b (IIF 2013a: 7)	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with being a member of the higher group (IIF 2013a: 6). The bylaws do not say if the upward 
mobility option exists only for the groups mentioned, though the fact two group are specified 
seems to indicate that no upward mobility option is available for members placed in groups IV or 
V. Double moves, where a Group III member becomes a Group I by jumping to Group II and 
then jumping again, are impossible: the IIF only allows one jump a year and the bylaws state that 
members are classified annually (IIF 2013a: 6).  
 The Group in which a member is placed in is important; it determines the membership 
dues the organization must pay to the IIF. The dues paid by a member matter, for they are used 
to distribute the votes amongst members: simply put, the more you pay, the more votes you get. 
Article III, section 12 states: “In all matters (…) approval by the members shall be by majority 
vote (…) and each Member shall have one (1) vote for each $10,000 in annual dues paid by such 
Member.” (IIF 2013a: 6). This rule does two things: first, it provides an incentive to lower ranked 
members to jump to a higher group. Second, and more importantly, it ensures that members of 
Group I (those with total assets above $200 billion) have more control over what the IIF does and 
does not do than members from other groups. The membership dues are not made public, though 
the IIF does indicate that they use total assets to determine them9. Still, all signs indicate it 
concerns large quantities of money: in their annual report over 2012, the IIF indicates it had an 
operating revenue of $32,8 million, which amounts to 97,7% of their total revenue (IIF 2013b: 
57).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 IIF, 2013. http://www.iif.com/membership/#dues, accessed June 16th 2013 
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Voting Rights 
In this section, I will take a closer look at the way the voting process within the IIF takes shape. 
In order to show what the voting system of the IIF looks like, I will discuss how their 
membership setup differs from the one employed by a similar organization, the ISDA. After that, 
I will show how the system of categorizing membership is worked into a voting system by the 
IIF.  
 
The provisions with regard to voting found in the IIF bylaws are especially interesting when 
compared to a similar document from a different organization. The ISDA is an organization that 
represents the participants of the derivatives market and says it “fosters safe and efficient 
derivatives markets to facilitate effective risk management for all users of derivative products”10. 
Membership of the ISDA is handled slightly differently than that of the IIF, though both have 
ways of differentiating between paying members. In its bylaws, ISDA specifies three types of 
membership: primary, associate and subscriber (ISDA 2011: 3). For all practical purposes, the 
primary members are the ones that matter, since they are the group comprised of investment, 
merchant and commercial banks that are in the business of derivative swapping. The other two 
classes are reserved for organizations that are in other ways connected to swaps and/or 
derivatives, but do not directly work with them (the bylaws specifically mention law firms, 
accounting firms and consulting firms). The defining trait for these companies or persons is that 
they are interested in the business, but not directly involved. The non-primary members pay 
different dues and, as is the case with the IIF, do not get to vote. Unlike the IIF however, the 
ISDA does not differentiate between primary members: every primary member gets a single vote 
(ISDA 2011: 6-7). Both organizations do use the same system to make decisions in the same way: 
decisions are taken by a majority of the available votes (ISDA 2011: 6-7, IIF 2013a: 6). The 
difference between the two lies in the way the votes are distributed amongst the members.  
  
For the ISDA, this system means that of its 836 total members, only 194 have a right to vote. The 
other 642 members are either associate member (290 members) or subscriber (352 members)11. In 
other words, the ISDA’s decision-making power lies with the 23% of members who qualify as 
primary members, the other 77% are without voting authority (see Fig. 1). Furthermore, all ISDA 
leadership is entirely of primary member provenance: “Each member of the Board of Directors 
(…) must be an officer, partner, principal or employee of a Primary Member or of the affiliate 
through which a Primary Member conducts its business in [derivatives]” (ISDA 2011: 7). It is 
important to stress that this is a key difference in the way these two organizations go about 
making decisions: for the ISDA, membership status is only related to the type of company the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  ISDA,	  2013.	  http://www2.isda.org/about-isda/mission-statement/, accessed June 16th 2013 
11 ISDA, 2013 http://www2.isda.org/membership/members-list/, accessed June 16th 2013	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member is: banks become primary members, while supporting companies, such as consultancy or 
legal firms, become associate members. Anyone else becomes a subscriber. At a glance, it seems 
undemocratic that 23% of members hold 100% of the decisions, but all members in the Primary 
Member group are equal and given a single vote, and their membership to the 23% is not in any 
way related to their assets.  
The IIF’s membership grouping is set up in a different way. The choice between associate 
and ‘regular’ membership is one every member can make: 42 of 142 associate members are some 
type of financial company (see Appendix B). This means 30% of the IIF’s associate members 
would not be associate members if the IIF employed the same rules as the ISDA, since these 
members are active agents in the world of international finance rather than supporting 
companies. More importantly, the members that do have voting rights are further divided into 
groups by the IIF. According to the ISDA’s bylaws, all these members are equal (ISDA 2011: 3), 
according to the IIF; some are more equal than others (IIF 2013a: 6-7). In figure 2, it becomes 
clear how exactly the IIF’s members are divided (for a more specific overview, see Appendix A). 
Straight off the bat, 40% of the organizations listed as IIF members become irrelevant to the 
voting process, since Associate Members (32%), Special Affiliates (5%) and Multilateral 
Organizations (3%) do not get to vote. Once those non-voting members are removed, that leaves 
just the groups as seen in figure 3 (see Appendix A for a more detailed list). As figure 3 shows, 
Group 1 ($200 billion or more in total assets) consists of a third of the total members with voting 
rights. Group 4 holds the biggest chunk of the IIF’s membership: 44% of IIF members fall in the 
$3-50 billion US dollar total asset range, which is unsurprising considering how broadly defined 
this Group is. Groups 2, 3, and 5 are relatively small.  
 What this makeup means in terms of votes is difficult to ascertain, since membership 
dues, which determine the amount of votes each Group Member gets, are not publically 
available. However, even assuming a flat percentage is taken per group, large discrepancies 
between membership Groups are unavoidable. Assuming a scenario in which a percentage of the  
	   12	  
Table 2: Vote diffusion in the IIF 
 Threshold (US$) Dues 
(US$)12 
Votes per 
member13 
Group Size14 Vote Total 
Group 1 200 billion 2 million 200 87 17,400 
Group 2 100 billion 1 million 100 20 2,000 
Group 3 50 billion 500,000 50 24 1,200 
Group 4 3 billion 150,000 3 118 354 
Group 5 1 billion15 10,000 1 19 19 
TOTAL - - - 268 20,973 
  
minimum Group Membership threshold is taken, the simple fact that the minimum threshold 
jumps considerably between groups III and IV (the threshold for group III is nearly seventeen 
times higher than the threshold for group IV), creates a situation where the voting power of 
groups IV and V is reduced considerably (see Table 2). 
 
Though speculative, table 2 does illustrate the way in which the rules set by the IIF’s bylaws 
produce a very large institutional advantage to certain membership groups of the organization. If 
the IIF indeed uses a flat percentage to calculate the annual dues, the math works out such that 
two Group 1 members (total 400 votes) can outvote all 118 Group 4 members (354 votes). In 
total, 20,973 votes exist in Table 2, meaning that 53 Group 1 members can outvote the other 215 
members of the IIF.    
 
Directorial Makeup  
One of the clearest, most visible results of the system set up by the IIF’s bylaws can be found 
when looking at the Board of Directors, the executive office of the IIF, to which an entire section 
of the bylaws is dedicated. The entirety of article IV of the bylaws is used to outline the way this 
body is to be set up, function and what its responsibilities and powers are (IIF 2013a: 8-10). The 
powers and obligations of the Board are broadly defined within the bylaws. The bylaws16 give the 
board full power to do spend the IIF’s money, manage its affairs, and determine its own 
regulations (IIF 2013a: 9). In other words, the Board of Directors is responsible for most of the 
day-to-day management of the IIF. Furthermore, the bylaws were later amended to include a 
provision that allows the Board to “alter, amend or repeal these bylaws (…) at any regular or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Purely to illustrate the discrepancies, dues are assumed to be 0,001% of total assets every year 
13 As per the IIF bylaws art. III, section 12, 1 vote per US $10,000 (IIF 2013a: 6) 
14 Based on Appendix A 
15 The IIF bylaws specify no minimum total asset valuation for Group 5. This table assumes a minimum total asset 
value of $1 billion.  
16 IIF Bylaws: article IV, section 4, subsection a (IIF 2013a: 9) 
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special meeting of the board, by the affirmative vote of a majority of the entire Board of 
Directors” (IIF 2013a: 14). In short, the IIF’s Board of Directors functions as a cabinet for the 
IIF, and has a great deal of decision-making power.  
 
The Board is a direct result of the power balance within the organization, as well as a 
consequence of the voting system discussed earlier. A more in-depth look will now be taken at 
the Board of Directors itself. Taken by themselves, the section of the bylaws that deals with the 
Board of Directors provides a framework for a governing body of the organization that appears 
more egalitarian than the general membership: the Board is to have 37 members, 29 elected by 
the members, 7 elected by the board and one being the IIF President-CEO, who is himself elected 
by the Board of Directors (IIF 2013a: 8, 10). Unlike the members, each Director is given a single 
vote, and decisions are made by a majority of the directors (IIF 2013a: 9). However, when 
examining the net results of the system the bylaws put in place, it becomes clear a level playing 
field does not exist.  
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First, the bylaws state that the first annual meeting of the IIF is the occasion where the IIF 
members will elect an inaugural Board of Directors. Following that first event, the members will 
take a back seat and choose the new Board members from a list of candidates nominated by the 
existing board (IIF 2013a: 8). In the process of nomination, several factors are to be taken into 
account. These factors are specified by the bylaws, and serve as guidelines for who is nominated: 
“in making [Directorial] nominations, the Board of Directors may also take into account: (I) The 
number of memberships in each membership Group; (II) The need for representation of different 
types of financial institutions; (III) The need to reflect the geographic diversity in membership; 
and (IV) The desirability of nominating senior executive officers of Members at the highest 
possible decision-making level who have broad authority within their institutions in the areas of 
activity of the Institute” (IIF 2013a: 8). However, none of these considerations are mentioned 
prior to the most important qualification for the job of Director, which is proportional 
contribution: “In nominating directors for election by the Members, the Board of Directors shall 
take into account representation of Membership Groups based on the proportional contribution 
of each Group to the funding of the Institute through annual dues” (IIF 2013: 8).  
 
Once again, the Group membership is critical to the way the IIF goes about its business. 
Furthermore, the Board of Directors is a self-reinforcing body; it can decide of its own accord 
who to nominate, since members only get to vote yes or no on any given nomination. This 
creates a situation in which the Board of Directors has a great deal of influence on who is allowed 
entry to the IIF’s day-to-day leadership. Though the bylaws do somewhat limit the discretionary 
power of the Board when it comes to whom they nominate and why, it is noteworthy that when 
it comes to proportional contributions the bylaws are very clear: the board shall take that into 
account. For the four points that follow, in which the importance of representation of relative 
group size, type of institutions, and geographical factors are mentioned, there is no language 
mandating their importance: the Board “may also” take those things into consideration, which 
means they do not have to (IIF 2013a: 8).  
 The results of the system set up in the bylaws are shown in figure 4: in 2012, a massive 
81% (30 of 37) of Directors come from Group 1 members, while the largest Group in terms of 
absolute numbers, Group 4, is represented by only 5% (2 of 37) of the Directors (for a detailed 
list, see Appendix C). Furthermore, as figure 5 shows, the Board is very much dominated by 
European banks, which control 43% (16 of 37) members. The continental representation is 
especially harsh to Africa, South America and Australia, who collectively control 14% of the 
directors (5 of 37). However, even North America is not very well represented, as their 16% (6 of 
37) share is inflated by the presence of a non-member Board Member: the IIF’s president and 
CEO. It should be noted that the official Board Counsel, a representative of the American 
Enterprise Institute, is also from North America (the USA, specifically). 
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It is also important to take note that the founding members of the IIF elected the inaugural board. 
These founding members are listed in the quarter-centennial review of the IIF. Without exception 
they are very large, very wealthy banks and all members of Group 1 (IIF 2007: 177-8). This, in 
addition to the institutional edge they are given by the bylaws’ emphasis on relative 
contributions, has given these Group 1 banks (and Group 1 members in general) another 
important advantage over the rest of the IIF membership: first-mover advantage. In his article 
From Failure to Failure, Lall notes the fundamental impact this first-mover advantage has: “actors 
claiming ‘first-mover advantage’ have enormous leverage at a critical juncture in the regulatory 
process, since policy decisions made at an early stage tend to be self-reinforcing” (Lall 2012: 616). 
Determining how large the first-mover advantage is, is exceedingly hard to pinpoint. The only 
thing that is absolutely certain is that as per the IIF’s own overview of their Directors (IIF 2013b: 
4-5), the Board of Directors is dominated by institutions similar to its founding members: very 
wealthy and from large economies.  	  
Implications 
Having considered the membership grouping, the general voting system, and the makeup of the 
Board of Directors, the question becomes what the results, presented in the previous section, 
mean with regard to the existence of first-order capture. 
 
The implementation of the A-IRB approach became subject of a lobbying campaign around 1998. 
At the time, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (or BCBS) had finalized plans for a 
revision of the so-called Basel Accord of 1988. Simply put, the Basel Accords are the rules of the 
game when it comes to international finance. The BCBS is a committee made up of Central 
Bankers, and the rules set forth by them are the rules that any internationally operating bank 
needs to follow17. This lobbying effort was made by both the IIF (2007: 67-77) and the ISDA 
(1998): the goal was simple: to have the Basel II Accord allow for use of the A-IRB approach. In 
the quarter-centennial review, the IIF recalls the arguments it used to convince the BCBS in the 
period between 1998 and 2004: internal ratings would lead to a system better attuned to real 
capital risks, provide real incentive for banks to upgrade their own risk assessment systems, and 
improve the BCBS’ ability to safeguard the system (IIF 2007: 77). In other words, the A-IRB 
approach was a win-win for the industry as well as the regulators.  
 Kevin L. Young (2012) argues against the assertion by other scholars that the BCBS 
simply followed the orders given by the private sector when it come to allowing the use of the A-
IRB approach. Young (2012: 672-4) describes the BCBS as an active party in the debate, rather 
than the meek follower of industry pressures other authors, such as Lall (2012: 611-13), and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  BCBS,	  2013.	  http://www.bis.org/bcbs/about.htm,	  accessed	  June	  16th	  2013.	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Zhang and Underhill (2004: 545-6) portray them. Regardless of the BCBS’ posture during the 
negotiations, by the time Basel II was being implemented, the A-IRB approach was part of it, 
even if the implementation was not as far-reaching as the private sector wanted it to be (Lall 
2012: 620, Young 2012: 674). With regards to first-order capture, it is important to note that A-
IRB as a system in and of itself does not serve the entire financial industry. In addition to 
lowering the capital requirement for risks taken by banks, Lall asserts that due to the complexity 
of the systems and the costs associated with building an internal rating system, A-IRB is available 
only to the largest banks: “the introduction of [the A-IRB approach] would also give the largest 
banks a substantial competitive advantage over smaller rivals” (2012: 613). Even the IIF 
recognizes that internal ratings is not for everyone, stating that the reason to implement a tiered 
system (where one tier would not be allowed internal risk models and another would), was not to 
provide a level playing field, but instead to be “geared to the realities of today’s global capital 
markets” (IIF 2007: 69). In other words, the IIF’s push for A-IRB was not motivated by a desire 
to provide a level playing field for all its members, but rather to consolidate the status quo of the 
late nineties for its ‘upper tier’ members. In the end, this mission was a success, as the BCBS 
allowed for the A-IRB approach to be used by the larger banks (BCBS 2004: 48).  
Second, there is a deterring effect that first-order capture has had on the membership of 
the IIF. When listing the differences in the ways the ISDA and IIF differentiate between 
members, it was established that while the ISDA determines the membership status of each 
member in accordance with their activity, the IIF allows members to choose their level of 
involvement, as either associate or regular members, themselves. In short, the ISDA’s bylaws 
indicate that the ISDA determines what sort of member their members are, and uses that 
knowledge to put the member in one of three groups: Primary (“any person or entity that (…) 
deals in derivatives”), Associate (“any person or entity that provides professional services to 
Primary members”) or Subscriber (“anyone not eligible for Primary or Associate membership”) 
(ISDA 2011: 2). This is not the way the IIF handles its membership: a member is free to choose 
‘regular’ or associate membership. It is only after ‘regular’ membership has been chosen that the 
system with the Membership Groups and the associated vote distribution comes into play.  
 This has led to a situation in which 42 out of 142 associate members of the IIF are of the 
type that would have been primary members of the ISDA by default. These companies include 
investment banks, hedge funds, private banks and investment management firms (IIF 2013b: 61-
2, for a more detailed list see Appendix B). As figure 6 shows, these 42 members make up 30% of 
the total associate members. Since there is no mechanism that mandates these members to 
become ‘regular’ members, these associate members do not need to justify their choice in any 
way. It can be argued that the reason these members avoid regular membership can be traced 
back to the first-order capture of the IIF by its most powerful members and the institutional 
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makeup of the organization as a result of this first-order capture. This deterrence occurs in two 
ways: reinforcement of free rider problems and practical concerns.  
 
Whenever collective action is undertaken, the free rider problem comes into play. Essentially, if 
an actor is rational and means to maximize gains and minimize losses, it becomes increasingly 
rational for him to seek a role that allows him to contribute as little as possible and still receives 
all the benefits from the collective (Hardin 2013). With individuals, this sort of behaviour might 
be considered counter-productive, a-moral or reprehensible; a company need not concern itself 
with such labels. In the case of the IIF, the free rider problem is aggravated by the relative 
distribution of power within the organization: an associate member who according to total assets 
would be placed in Group 1, such as Capital Group International, Inc. (who manage over a 
trillion dollars in assets), can avoid paying the Group 1 membership dues by remaining an 
associate member whilst still having the benefit of associate membership. The free rider incentive 
is especially strong for Group 1 rated members of the 42 financial actor associates, since the 
institutional makeup discussed earlier guarantees their interests are still being amply represented.  
 For many more members, practical concerns may lie at the core of their decision to 
remain associate member. Many of the 42 associate members are not Group 1 members, but fall 
in one of the lesser categories. This means that their possible influence on the course the IIF 
chooses is not very big. Harkening back to the rationality of companies, the case for associate 
membership, with lower annual dues and no voting rights, is stronger than the case for regular 
membership, with the regular annual dues and a vote that has little to no impact. This of course is 
always a problem for any organization, but it is easy to see how this problem is much more 
pronounced in the case of the IIF: the Membership Groups and the membership dues deciding 
the number of votes for each member create a strong negative incentive for any non-group 1 
member considering to join the constituency. In spite of all this, regular IIF membership is still 
growing. Though this makes very little sense from a rational point of view, one reason for this 
continued growth might be that members are forced to conform thanks to the logic of 
appropriateness, which moves actors to increase their legitimacy and strengthen their identity by 
sharing in the values and norms (Sending 2002: 449). 	  
Life Cycle 
As mentioned in the theoretical framework, regulatory and first-order capture have a relation to 
norm dynamics. According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 895-6), norms change over time 
and follow a three-stage life cycle in the process of doing so: first, a new norm must emerge 
(norm emergence), then it must gather a following (norm cascade), until finally it is widely 
accepted and followed (norm internalization). This three-stage life cycle is mostly irrelevant as far 
as the subject of this essay is concerned, since the capture (both regulatory and first-order) takes 
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place before the so-called tipping point between norm emergence and norm cascade. Regulatory 
capture describes the process where actors, who should not be involved in the process prior to the 
cascade or internalization stage, co-opt the first stage of the life cycle. This situation leads to a 
first-mover advantage for these actors, which leads to a change in the intent of the norm 
entrepreneur (in this situation, the BCBS is the norm entrepreneur). In other words, rather than 
signing up for the new norms at the norm cascade stage, regulatory capture allows organizations 
such as the IIF and the ISDA to obtain a first-mover advantage in a stage where, technically, they 
should not (for a more detailed explanation of first-mover advantage and its effects, see Lall 
2012).  
 First-order capture has a similar effect to regulatory capture, but in a different cycle 
altogether. Before the advocacy process starts, norms must emerge, cascade and be internalized 
within the advocacy groups themselves. This is the part of the process where first-order capture 
comes into play. In the case of the IIF, the location where the bulk of the first-order capture 
actually takes place in the second stage. It is this second stage of the life cycle, the cascade, where 
the first-order capture sets in. Simply put, the Group 1 members of the IIF have so much power 
compared to the other groups that within the organization, they can cascade whatever norm they 
choose. In absolute terms, Group 1 may make up only 33% of the IIF’s members (see Fig. 3), but 
the rules set out in the bylaws set up a system where Group 1’s relative share is much greater than 
that. Finnemore and Sikkink describe the cascade stage in terms of countries accepting a new 
piece of legislation (1998: 902-4). In the context of the IIF however, the voting system requires a 
different terminology to be used to describe the process: not actors (countries) support the 
emerging norm, but votes.  
 
Thus the process of a norm change is altered by both regulatory and first-order capture. First, 
first-order capture creates a situation in which the advocacy networks see the emergence, cascade 
and internalization of norms that ultimately serve only a small part of the members (and in some 
cases, such as A-IRB, does a disservice to others). Next, regulatory capture ensures that this 
advocacy network has early access and a first-mover advantage in discussions with the norm 
entrepreneur at the international regulatory level. If we take the A-IRB approach as an example, 
the end of the second cycle saw the internalization of a norm that the BCBS initially considered 
undesirable (Young 2012: 673) and that provided a competitive advantage given to larger banks 
over smaller ones, which went against the stated goals of both the IIF and the BCBS (Lall 2012: 
613).  
 
Conclusion 
With this article, I set out to do an institutional analysis of the Institute of International Finance, 
and to determine whether or not it has been subject of first-order capture. Through an 
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examination of the bylaws of the IIF, as well as their Annual Report of 2012 and their quarter-
centennial review published in 2007, I have attempted to find out how the organizations comes to 
its decisions, who ends up making the decisions and in the interest of whom these decisions are 
made. It is the conclusion of this article and my investigation that there is indeed a strong case to 
be made about the first-order capture of the IIF.  
 Unlike regulatory capture, for which the evidence of the capture can best be found by 
observing the results of the regulatory process, as well as the process itself, first-order capture can 
be found much more effectively by carefully examining the institutional makeup of an 
organization. This is the case because unlike regulatory capture, first-order capture does not occur 
in unregulated exchanges of information or private conversations. Instead, it has been found 
codified and hard-wired into the organization from the very early beginning. A tremendous first-
mover advantage is given to founding members of organizations, who by virtue of being the 
parties involved in writing the rules can have a formidable and long-lasting impact on the 
organizational structure. The fact that even in 2013, 81% of the Directors of the IIF come from 
Group 1 members is a telling piece of evidence to support the idea that the IIF is, in practice, an 
organization serving its wealthiest and most powerful members, rather than supporting the 
“efficiency, transparency, stability and competitiveness of the global financial system”18 it claims 
to, the organization is heavily incentivised to support the competitiveness of the global financial 
giants, who as members of Membership Group 1 are the most powerful entities within the IIF.  
That said, it is also important to note that the bylaws and the way I have interpreted them 
in this article have perhaps drawn a harsher picture of the IIF than exists in reality. Though the 
members are grouped according to their total assets and different measures of influence are 
bestowed upon these groups, this difference may be more technical than practical. The fact one 
bank falls into Group 1, while another falls into Group 4 does not necessarily mean their interests 
are at odds with each other most, or even some, of the time. If and how exactly these interests 
diverge was not the subject of this article, but may provide an interesting subject for future 
research. What this article can say is that regardless of their interests, Group 1 members are given 
an institutional edge whenever the members get to vote, and by its very nature this creates an 
inequality amongst the members of the organization. This constitutes first-order capture, since 
everything that follows from this institutional advantage, from the day-to-day to the long-term 
goals of the IIF, is aimed at serving the powerful minority rather than the general majority of 
members.  
  
The consequences of the first-order capture I have illustrated in this essay are two-fold; on the one 
hand the choices made by the organization with regards to its advocacy goals are influenced. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  IIF,	  2013.	  http://www.iif.com/about/,	  accessed	  June	  16th	  2013.	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Rules that benefit the powerful minority are supported by the organization as a whole, even if it 
means a competitive disadvantage for other members. On the other hand, the powerlessness of 
the smaller members, and the pre-existing dominance of others, creates a negative incentive 
towards membership. Smaller members are faced with a situation where their individual vote is 
even more insignificant than any single vote within a constituency of 268 already is. For larger 
organizations, who would be placed in Group 1, there is a very powerful free rider incentive not 
to apply for ‘regular’ membership: associate membership is a cheaper option for these 
organizations, and the status quo already serves their interests.  
If nothing else, this article has shown that an investigation of the rules and regulations of 
an advocacy group can yield interesting results for those who look for first-mover advantages and 
first-order capture occurrences. This article cannot say whether or not the IIF’s way of 
membership grouping and influence distribution is commonplace amongst advocacy networks; 
this will have to be examined by future research. What can be said is that different systems, 
without size-specific influence determination, do exist. The system outlined by the ISDA in its 
bylaws, for example, determine membership status according to the level of involvement rather 
than total assets. Such a system however, is not the one the IIF, the worlds’ largest representative 
of the financial sector, uses. Instead, a system is employed that allows the largest banks in the 
world to dominate the organization thanks to first-order capture.  
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APPENDIX A: IIF MEMBERSHIP STATUS OVERVIEW 
 
All membership data taken from the most recent verified source, the IIF’s 2012 annual review (IIF 2013b: 
60-4). Shorthand used: AM (Associate Member), SP (Special Affiliate) and MO (Multilateral 
Organization).  
 
Company (alphabetical per country)  Status   notes 
 
Algeria 
Banque Extérieure d’Algerie    4 
Credit Populaire D’Algerie     4 
 
Argentina 
Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires   4 
Banco de la Provincia de Córdoba    4 
Banco Galicia      4 
Banco Hipotecario     5 
Banco Supervielle S.A     5 
 
Australia 
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited  1 
Commonwealth Bank Group    1 
Export Finance and Insurance Corporation   AM 
Future Fund      AM 
Macquarie Group Limited     2 
National Australia Bank Ltd.    1 
Suncorp Group Limited     3 
Westpac Banking Corporation    1 
 
Austria 
MIMA Kapitalanlage AG    AM 
BAWAG P.S.K.     4 
Erste Bank      1 
Ithuba Capital AG     AM 
Raiffeisen International Bank-Holding AG  2 
 
Bahrain 
Ahli United Bank      4 
Arab Banking Corporation     4 
BMI Bank B.S.C.       5 
Economic Development Board    AM 
Gulf International Bank B.S.C.    4   
United Gulf Bank, B.S.C.     5 
 
Belgium 
Dexia       1 
Euroclear SA/NV      AM 
European Development Finance Institutions (EDFI)  4 
KBC Bank N.V.      1 
ONDD        AM 
 
Bermuda 
Arch Capital Group Ltd.     AM 
The Bank of N.T. Butterfield & Son, ltd   4 
 
 
 
	   25	  
Company (alphabetical per country)   Status  notes 
 
Brazil 
Banco BBM S.A.      4  
Banco Bradesco S.A.     2 
Banco Central do Brasil     SP     
Banco da Amazonia     4 
Banco do Brasil S.A.     1  
Banco Fator – Seguradora     4 
Banco Fibra S.A.      4 
Banco Votorantim S.A.      3   
BNDES       AM 
BTG Pactual      AM 
FEBRABAN      SP 
Gávea Investimentos     AM 
Itaú Unibanco Multiplo S.A.    1 
Vale       AM 
 
Bulgaria 
United Bulgarian Bank AD     4 
 
Canada 
Bank of Nova Scotia     1 
BMO Financial Group     1 
Canadian Bankers Association    SP 
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC)  1 
Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec   AM    
CPP Investment Board     AM 
Export Development Canada    SP 
Manulife Financial      AM 
OMERS Capital Markets     AM 
Ontario Teachers Pension Plan    AM 
RBC Financial Group     1 
TD Bank Financial Group     1 
 
Chile 
Banco Central de Chile     SP 
Banco de Chile      4 
Banco de Credito e Inversiones    4 
BancoEstado      4 
Corp Banca      4 
Grupo Security       4 
Larrain Vial SA Corredora de Bolsa    AM 
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Company (alphabetical per country)   Status  notes 
 
China, People’s Republic 
Agricultural Bank of China     1 
Agricultural Development Bank of China   AM 
Bank of Beijing      1 
Bank of China      1 
Bank of Communications     1 
Beijing Rural Commercial Bank    3  
China CITIC Bank     1 
China Construction Bank     1 
China Development Bank     1 
China Galaxy Securities Company Limited   AM 
China Guangfa Bank Co., Ltd    2 
China Huarong Asset Management Corporation  AM 
China International Capital Corporation Limited  AM 
China Life Insurance (Group) Company   AM 
China Merchants Bank     1 
China UnionPay Co., Ltd.     AM 
Hua Xia Bank      2 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Ltd  1 
Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, Ltd.  AM 
The Export-Import Bank of China    AM 
 
Colombia 
Asobancaria      SP 
Banco Davivienda S.A.     4    
Bancolombia S.A.      3 
Banco De La Republica     SP 
Fondo LatinoAmericano de Reservas   4  MO** 
 
Costa Rica 
Banco Nacional de Costa Rica    4 
 
Croatia 
Privredna Banka Zagreb d.d.    4 
 
Denmark 
Danske Bank A/S      1    
Nykredit Realkredit A/S      3 
 
Dominican Republic 
Grupo Financiero León      4 
 
Ecuador 
Produbanco      5 
MerchantBansa S.A.     AM      
 
Egypt 
African Export-Import Bank    AM 
Arab African International Bank    4 
Arab International Bank     4 
Banque Misr      4 
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) S.A.E.  4 
National Bank for Development     4 
National Bank of Egypt     4 
Suez Canal Bank     4 
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Company (alphabetical per country)   Status  notes 
 
Finland 
Finnvera Plc.      AM 
Nordic Investment Bank     4  MO 
OP-Pohjola Group     3 
 
France 
AXA Group      AM 
BNP Paribas      1 
BPCE       1 
CIC Group      1 
Coface       AM 
Council of Europe Development Bank   4  MO 
Credit Agricole      1 
Lazard       AM 
Natixis       1 
Société Générale      1 
 
Germany 
Allianz SE      AM 
Angermayer, Brumm & Lange    AM 
Association of German Banks    SP 
Bayern LB      1 
Commerzbank AG     1 
DekaBank Deutsche Girozentrale    1 
Deutsche Bank AG     1 
Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG    1   
Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband    SP 
DZ Bank      1 
Euler Hermes      AM 
Landesbank Baden-Württemberg    1 
 
Ghana 
Bank of Ghana      SP 
 
Greece 
Alpha Bank      3 
The Black Sea Trade and Development Bank   5  MO 
Eurobank EFG S.A.     3 
National Bank of Greece, S.A.    2  
The Olayan Group     AM 
Piraeus Bank      4 
 
Honduras 
Banco Ficensa      5 
Banco Ficohsa      5 
Central American Bank for Economic Integration  4  MO  
 
Hong Kong SAR, China 
Hong Kong Exchanges & Clearing Ltd.   AM 
Lim Advisors Limited     AM 
 
Hungary 
Central European International Bank Ltd.   4  
MFB Hungarian Development Bank    4 
MKB Bank      4 
OTP       4 
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Company (alphabetical per country)   Status  notes 
 
India 
Aptivaa Consulting Solutions Ltd.    AM     
Bank of Baroda      1 
Bank of India      1 
Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd.  AM 
Export-Import Bank of India     AM 
ICICI Bank      1 
Kotak Mahindra Bank      5 
State Bank of India     1 
 
Indonesia 
P.T. Bank Mandiri      3    
 
 
Iraq 
Trade Bank of Iraq     4 
 
Ireland 
Allied Irish Bank      1 
Bank of Ireland      1 
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Ltd.   Liquidated*** 
 
Italy 
Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A.    AM     
Associazione Bancaria Italiana    SP 
Banca Monte dei Pashi di Siena    1   
Banca Sella S.p.A.     4 
Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A.     1 
UniCredit Group      1 
 
Jamaica  
National Commercial Bank Jamaica Ltd   4 
 
Japan 
Development Bank of Japan Inc.     AM 
Japan Bank for International Coordination   AM 
Canon Institute for Global Studies    AM 
Mitsubishi Corporation     AM 
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group    1 
Mizuho Financial Group     1 
Nippon Export and Investment Insurance Corporation (NEXI) AM 
Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group    1 
The Norinchukin Bank     1 
Takata Corporation     AM 
 
Jordan 
Arab Bank Plc      4 
Bank of Jordan      5 
The Housing Bank for Trade & Finance   4 
Jordan Islamic Bank     4 
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Company (alphabetical per country)   Status  notes 
 
Korea 
Export-Import Bank of Korea    AM 
Hana Bank      1 
KB Financial Group     1 
Korea Center for International Finance   AM 
Korea Development Bank     2 
Korea Exchange Bank     3 
Korea Finance Corporation    AM 
Korea Investment Corporation    AM 
Korea Trade Insurance Corporation    AM 
NongHyup Bank      2    
Woori Finance Holdings     1 
 
Kuwait 
Al-Ahli Bank of Kuwait     4 
Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development  AM 
Burgan Bank      4 
Gulf Bank K.S.C.      4 
Gulf Investment Corporation    AM 
Kuwait Financial Centre S.A.K. (Markaz)   AM 
Kuwait International Bank     4 
Kuwait Investment Authority    AM 
National Bank of Kuwait, S.A.K.    3 
 
Lebanon 
Association of Banks in Lebanon    SP 
BankMed      4 
Banque Audi, S.A.L. – Audi Saradar Group   4 
Banque du Liban      SP 
Banque Libano-Française, S.A.L     4 
Blom Bank, S.A.L.     4 
BSL       5 
Byblos Bank, S.A.L.     4 
Credit Libanais, S.A.L.     4 
Fransabank, S.A.L.     4 
Societe Generale de Banque au Liban   4    
 
Luxembourg 
Banque et Caisse d’Epargne de l’Etat    4 
 
Malaysia 
CIMB Group      2 
Malayan Banking Berhad     2 
 
Malta 
Bank of Valletta Plc      4 
 
Mexico 
Banco Financiero Interacciones, S.A.   4 
Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior, S.N.C.  AM 
Asociación de Bancos de Mexico, ABM, AC   SP  
BBVA Bancomer      2 
Grupo Financiero Banamex, S.A.    3 
Grupo Financiero Banorte     3 
Reaseguradora Patria     AM   
Sociedad Hipotecaria Federal, S.N.C.   AM 
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Company (alphabetical per country)   Status  notes 
 
Mongolia 
Golomt Bank of Mongolia      5 
Mongolian Bankers Association    SP    
 
Morocco 
Banque Marocaine du Commerce Exterieur    4 
 
Netherlands 
ABN AMRO      1 
Aegon N.V.      AM 
Atradius Dutch State Business    AM 
Credit Europe Bank N.V.      4 
ING Group N.V.      1 
Rabobank Nederland     1 
Shell International BV     AM 
 
Nicaragua 
BANPRO      4****  estimate 
 
Nigeria 
Access Bank      4 
Central Bank of Nigeria     SP 
First Bank of Nigeria     4 
United Bank for Africa Plc     4 
Zenith Bank Plc      4 
 
Norway 
DNB       1 
 
Oman 
BankMuscat SAOG     4 
Muscat Insurance Company SAOC    AM 
Oman International Bank     5 
 
Pakistan 
Habib Bank      4 
National Bank of Pakistan     4 
United Bank Limited     4 
 
Palestine 
Bank of Palestine P.L.C.     5 
The Palestine Monetary Authority    SP 
 
Panama 
Banco General, S.A.     4    
 
Peru 
Banco de Credito del Perú     4 
 
Philippines 
Asian Development Bank     2  MO 
Bank of the Philippine Islands    4 
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Company (alphabetical per country)   Status  notes 
 
Poland 
Bank Gospodarki Zywnosciowej S.A.    4    
Bank PKO BP      4 
BRE Bank S.A.      4 
Citibank Handlowy     4 
 
Portugal 
Banco BIC Portguês, S.A.     4 
Banco BPI      4 
Banco Espirito Santo S.A.     3 
Caixa Geral de Depósitos, SA    2 
 
Qatar 
Commercialbank      4 
Doha Bank      4 
International Bank of Qatar    4 
Qatar Financial Centre     AM 
Qatar First Investment Bank    AM 
Qatar International Islamic Bank (QSC)   4 
Qatar Islamic Bank     4 
Qatar National Bank S.A.Q.    4 
QInvest       AM 
 
Russian Federation 
JSC VTB Bank      1  
 
Saudi Arabia 
Al Rajhi Bank      4 
Arab National Bank     4 
Bank Al Bilad      4  
Banque Saudi Fransi     4 
Islamic Corporation for the Development of the Private Sector  AM 
Jadwa Investment      AM 
National Commercial Bank     3  
SABB       4 
Samba Financial Group     4 
The Saudi Fund for Development    AM 
Saudi Hollandi Bank     4 
The Saudi Investment Bank    4 
 
Singapore 
DBS Bank      2 
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation  AM 
Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Limited   2 
 
South Africa 
Absa Group Limited     3 
BancABC      5 
FirstRand Bank      3 
Nedbank Group Limited     3 
Standard Bank Group Ltd.     2 
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Company (alphabetical per country)   Status  notes 
 
Spain 
Banco de Sabadell      2 
Banco Popular Espanol, S.A    2 
BBVA       1 
Bankia       1 
CaixaBank      1 
CESCE       AM 
Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros    SP 
Iberdrola S.A.       AM 
Santander, S.A.      1 
Spanish Bankers’ Association    SP 
 
Sweden 
EKN – ExportKreditnämnden    AM 
Handelsbanken      1 
Nordea Bank AB      1 
SEB Group      1 
Swedbank AB      1 
Swedish Bankers’ Association    SP*****  
 
Switzerland 
Aker International     AM 
Brevan Howard      AM 
Credit Suisse Group     1 
EFG Financial Products     4 
Hinduja Bank Ltd      4 
Notenstein Private Bank      AM 
Partners Group      AM 
Pictet & Cie, Banquiers     AM 
Swiss Re Ltd.      1 
UBS AG       1 
Zürcher Kantonalbank     2 
Zurich Insurance Group     1 
 
Taiwan, China 
Mega International Commercial Bank Co., Ltd.  1 
 
Thailand 
Bangkok Bank Public Company, Ltd.   3 
KASIKORNBANK Public Company Limited   4 
Siam Commercial Bank Public Company Limited  3 
 
Togo 
Ecobank Transnational, Inc.     4 
 
Trinidad and Tobago  
First Citizens Bank Limited    4 
Republic Bank Limited      4  
Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago   SP  
 
Tunisia 
African Development Bank     4  MO 
Amen Bank      4 
Banque Internationale Arabe de Tunisie   4 
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Company (alphabetical per country)   Status  notes 
 
Turkey 
Akbank       3 
Aktif Bank      5 
Alternatifbank A.S.     5 
Banks Association of Turkey    SP 
Burgan Bank A.S.      4 
Development Bank of Turkey    AM 
Eximbank of Turkey      AM 
Finansbank A.S.      4 
Garanti Bank A.S.     3 
Takasbank       5 
Sekerbank      4 
T.C. Ziraat Bankasi A.S.     3 
Türk Ekonomi Bankasi A.S.    4 
Türkiye Halk Bankasi A.S.     5 
Türkiye Is Bankasi A.S.     2 
Türkiye Sinai Kalkinma Bankasi A.S.   4 
Türkiye Vakilifar Bankasi T.A.O.    4 
Turkland Bank      5 
Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi A.S.     4 
 
United Arab Emirates 
Abraaj Capital      AM  
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank P.J.S.C.   2 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank     3 
Al Hilal Bank      1 
Dubai Financial Services Authority    SP 
Dubai International Financial Center   AM  
Emirates NBD      3 
Fajr Capital      AM 
First Gulf Bank      4 
Mashreqbank      4 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi    4 
National Bank of Fujairah     4 
Union National Bank     4 
 
United Kingdom 
Algebris Investments     AM  
Allen & Overy, LLP     AM  Laywers 
Barclays plc      1 
Baring Asset Management     AM 
Clifford Chance LLP     AM 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development  3  MO 
HSBC Holdings plc     1 
Kleinwort Benson      4 
KPMG       AM  Accountants 
Lloyds TSB Group plc     1 
Lone Star Management Europe Ltd.    AM 
Mazars       AM   Accountants 
Millennium Global     AM 
Newstate Partners LLP      AM  
Nomura International, plc      1 
Royal Bank of Scotland plc     1 
Standard Chartered plc     1 
White & Case LLP     AM  Lawyers 
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Company (alphabetical per country)   Status  notes 
 
United States 
Aflac, Ltd.      1 
American International Group    AM 
Amici Capital, LLC     AM 
Bain & Company, Inc.     AM  Consultants 
Bank of America Corporation    1 
BlackRock, Inc       AM 
Bladex Asset Management     AM  
BNY Mellon      1 
Bridgewater Associates, Inc.    AM 
CalPERS      AM  
Capital Group International, Inc.    AM 
Chevron Corporation     AM 
Citi       1 
Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton    AM  Lawyers 
CLS Bank International     AM  US Government 
CoBank       4 
Convexity Capital Management    AM 
Darby Overseas Investments, Limited   AM 
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP    AM  Lawyers 
Deloitte       AM  Accountant  
Ernst & Young      AM 
Export-Import Bank of the United States   AM 
Fidelity Management & Research Co.   AM 
Fitch Ratings      AM  rating agency 
Franklin Templeton Companies, LLC   AM 
Galileo Global Advisors     AM 
General Electric Company     AM 
Greylock Capital Management, LLC   AM 
Houlihan Lokey      AM 
Inter-American Development Bank    3  MO 
International Business Machines Corp. (IBM)   AM    
Goldman, Sachs & Co     1 
The International Finance Corporation    3  MO   
JPMorgan Chase & Co.     1 
MasterCard Worldwide     AM 
MBIA Insurance Corporation    AM 
McKinsey & Company     AM 
MetLife       AM 
MIGA       5  MO 
Moelis & Company LLC     AM   
Moody’s Corporation     AM  rating agency 
Morgan Stanley      1 
New York City Economic Development Corporation  AM 
Northern Trust Company     3 
Oaktree Capital Management LP    AM 
Oliver Wyman      AM 
The PNC Financial Services Group    1 
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP    AM 
Principal Financial Group     AM 
Promontory Financial Group, LLC    AM 
Prudential Financial     AM 
Putnam Investments     AM 
Rohatyn Group      AM 
Soros Fund Management     AM 
Standard & Poor’s     AM 
State Street Corporation     1 
TIAA-CREF      AM 
Toyota Motor North America    AM 
Tudor Investment Corporation    AM 
Visa, Inc.       AM 
Warburg Pincus LLC     AM 
Wellington Management Company, LLP   AM 
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Company (alphabetical per country)   Status  notes 
 
United States (cont.) 
 
Wells Fargo      1 
World Bank Group     1  MO 
 
Uruguay 
Banco Central del Uruguay     SP 
 
Venezuela 
Banco del Caribe      4 
Corporación Andina de Fomento    4  MO   
Mercantil Servicios Financieros    4 
 
 
 
* Special Affiliates are on a separate list in the IIF 2012 Annual Review, though no qualifications are 
provided about their status. Special affiliates are not mentioned in the bylaws or anywhere else. 
Since members include mostly central banks and banking associations, it is assumed special 
affiliates have roughly the same privileges as Associate Members. They are therefore not included 
in any influence-related graphs, since they do not get to vote.  
 
** Multilateral Organizations, like Special Affiliates, are listed separately in the 2012 Annual Review, 
though mentioned nowhere else. As with Special Affiliates, their membership status is assumed to 
be similar to the one specified for Associate Members in the bylaws.  
 
*** The Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Ltd. was liquidated overnight by the government of 
Ireland on the night of februari 7th 201319. For accuracy, the IRBC will not be factored into the 
dataset, even though every IIF source available still acknowledges their membership per December 
31st 2012 (IIF 2012  
 
**** There is no data on BANPRO’s total assets; however, they are the largest bank in Niceragua. The 
second bank of the country (not a member) comes within a quarter billion USD of Group 4 
membership, with a much smaller market share than BANPRO.  Thus it is assumed BANPRO is 
in fact a member of this Group.  
  
***** Though not officially listed as a special member, the Swedish Bankers’ Association is not a bank 
but a joint effort by a number of Swedish banks. Since all other such organizations are in fact 
Special Affiliates, and no accurate data about the SBA’s total assets is available online, it is 
assumed that like all organization like it, SBA is in fact a Special Affiliate of the IIF.  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  http://www.oireachtas.ie/documents/bills28/bills/2013/913/b913d.pdf	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APPENDIX B: IIF ASSOCIATE MEMBERS SPECIFIED 
 
Company name       Company type 
    
Export Finance and Insurance Corporation    Government of Australia 
Future Fund       Government of Australia 
MIMA Kapitalanlage AG      Investment Bank 
Ithuba Capital AG      Investment management 
Economic Development Board     Public Agency 
Euroclear SA/NV       Custodian Bank 
ONDD         Government of Belgium 
Arch Capital Group Ltd.      Insurance speculators 
BNDES        Development Bank 
BTG Pactual       Investment Bank 
Gávea Investimentos      Investment Bank 
Vale        Mining Corporation 
Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec    Pension Fund 
CPP Investment Board      Pension Fund 
Manulife Financial       Insurance 
OMERS Capital Markets      Pension Fund 
Ontario Teachers Pension Plan     Pension Fund 
Larrain Vial SA Corredora de Bolsa     Pension Fund 
Agricultural Development Bank of China    Development Bank 
China Galaxy Securities Company Limited    Investment Bank 
China Huarong Asset Management Corporation   Investment Bank 
China International Capital Corporation Limited   Investment Bank 
China Life Insurance (Group) Company    Insurance 
China UnionPay Co., Ltd.      Banking Cards 
Ping An Insurance (Group) Company of China, Ltd.   Insurance 
The Export-Import Bank of China     Government of China 
MerchantBansa S.A.      Investment bank association 
African Export-Import Bank     Var. Governments of Africa 
Finnvera Plc.       Government of Finland 
AXA Group       Insurance 
Coface        Government of France 
Lazard        Investment Bank 
Allianz SE       Financial Services 
Angermayer, Brumm & Lange     Financial Services 
Euler Hermes       Credit Insurance 
The Olayan Group      Investment Bank 
Hong Kong Exchanges & Clearing Ltd.    Stock Exchange 
Lim Advisors Limited      Investment Group 
Aptivaa Consulting Solutions Ltd.     Consultancy 
Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd.   Government of India 
Export-Import Bank of India      Government of India 
Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A.     Insurance   
Development Bank of Japan Inc.      Development Bank 
Japan Bank for International Coordination    Government of Japan 
Canon Institute for Global Studies     Research Institute 
Mitsubishi Corporation      Trading Companies 
Nippon Export and Investment Insurance Corporation (NEXI)  Government of Japan 
Takata Corporation      Automotive Parts Corp. 
Export-Import Bank of Korea     Government of S, Korea 
Korea Center for International Finance    Trade promotion 
Korea Finance Corporation     Government of S. Korea 
Korea Investment Corporation     Government of S. Korea 
Korea Trade Insurance Corporation     Government of S. Korea 
Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development   Pan-Arabian Governments 
Gulf Investment Corporation     Pan-Gulf Governments 
Kuwait Financial Centre S.A.K. (Markaz)    Trade Promotion 
Kuwait Investment Authority     Government of Kuwait 
Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterior, S.N.C.   Government of Mexico  
Reasugaradora Patria      Insurance 
Sociedad Hipotecaria Federal, S.N.C.    Development Bank 
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Aegon N.V.       Insurance 
Atradius Dutch State Business     Credit Insurance 
Shell International BV      Oil Company 
Muscat Insurance Company SAOC     Insurance 
Qatar Financial Centre      Trade Promotion 
Qatar First Investment Bank     Investment Bank 
QInvest        Investment Bank  
Islamic Corporation for the Development of the Private Sector   Development Bank 
Jadwa Investment      Stock Company 
The Saudi Fund for Development     Government of Saudi Arabia 
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation   Government of Singapore 
CESCE        Government of Spain 
Iberdrola S.A.        Electric Company 
EKN – ExportKreditnämnden     Government of Sweden 
Aker International      Oil Company 
Brevan Howard       Hedge Fund 
Notenstein Private Bank       Private Banking 
Partners Group       Private Equity 
Pictet & Cie, Banquiers      Private Banking 
Development Bank of Turkey     Development Bank 
Eximbank of Turkey       Government of Turkey 
Abraaj Capital       Private Equity 
Dubai International Financial Center    Trade promotion 
Fajr Capital       Investment Firm 
Algebris Investments      Hedge Fund 
Allen & Overy, LLP      Lawyers 
Baring Asset Management      Financial Service Dept. 
Clifford Chance LLP      Lawyers 
KPMG        Accountancy 
Lone Star Management Europe Ltd.    Investment Firm 
Mazars        Accountancy 
Millennium Global      Investment Firm 
Newstate Partners LLP       Consultancy 
White & Case LLP      Lawyers 
American International Group     Insurance 
Amici Capital, LLC      Hedge Fund 
Bain & Company, Inc.      Consultants 
BlackRock, Inc        Investment Firm 
Bladex Asset Management      Asset Management 
Bridgewater Associates, Inc.     Investment Management 
CalPERS       Pension Fund 
Capital Group International, Inc.     Investment Management 
Chevron Corporation      Oil Company 
Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton     Lawyers 
CLS Bank International      US Government 
Convexity Capital Management     Hedge Fund 
Darby Overseas Investments, Limited    Private Equity 
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP     Lawyers 
Deloitte        Accountancy 
Ernst & Young       Accountancy 
Export-Import Bank of the United States    Government of the USA 
Fidelity Management & Research Co.    Investment Management 
Fitch Ratings       Rating agency 
Franklin Templeton Companies, LLC    Finances Company 
Galileo Global Advisors      Consultancy 
General Electric Company      Electric Company 
Greylock Capital Management, LLC    Venture Capital Firm 
Houlihan Lokey       Investment Banking 
International Business Machines Corp. (IBM)    Computer Company  
MasterCard Worldwide      Credit Card Company 
MBIA Insurance Corporation     Insurance 
McKinsey & Company      Consultancy 
MetLife        Insurance 
Moelis & Company LLC      Financial Services 
Moody’s Corporation      Rating Agency 
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New York City Economic Development Corporation   Trade Promotion 
Oaktree Capital Management LP     Asset Management 
Oliver Wyman       Consultancy 
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP     Accountancy 
Principal Financial Group      Investment Management 
Promontory Financial Group, LLC     Consultancy 
Prudential Financial      Insurance 
Putnam Investments      Investment Management 
Rohatyn Group       Hedge Fund 
Soros Fund Management      Hedge Fund 
Standard & Poor’s      Rating Agency 
TIAA-CREF       Pension Fund 
Toyota Motor North America     Car Company 
Tudor Investment Corporation     Hedge Fund 
Visa, Inc.        Credit Card Company 
Warburg Pincus LLC      Private Equity 
Wellington Management Company, LLP    Consultancy 
 
 
TOTAL: 142 Associate members (42 financial companies) 
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APPENDIX C: DIRECTORIAL PROVENANCE 
 
Data gathered from the IIF Annual Review of 2012 (IIF 2013b: 6-7), Group membership 
determined in accordance with the IIF Bylaws (IIF 2013a: 11).  
 
From Member   Group    Continent  Country 
 
HSBC Holdings plc   1   Europe   UK 
 
Itaú Unibanco S/A   1     South America  Brazil 
Swiss Re Ltd.    1    Europe   Switzerland 
Scotiabank    1    North America  Canada 
 
SEB     1   Europe   Sweden 
 
Citigroup    1    North America  USA 
Commerzbank AG   1    Europe   Germany 
Arab African International Bank  4    Africa   Egypt 
Institute of International Finance  other    North America  USA 
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.  1    North America  USA 
Banco de Crédito del Perú  4    South America  Peru 
KB Financial Group   1    Asia   S. Korea 
Agricultural Bank of China  1   Asia   China PR 
National Bank of Kuwait  3    Asia   Kuwait 
UniCredit S.p.A.    1    Europe   Italy 
Barclays plc    1    Europe   UK 
Akbank T.A.S.    3    Asia   Turkey 
BBVA     1    Europe   Spain 
Ind. & Comm. Bank of China  1    Asia   China PR 
Standard Chartered PLC  1    Europe   UK 
Mizuho Financial Group  1    Asia   Japan 
ICICI Bank Ltd.    1    Asia   India 
Morgan Stanley    1    North America  USA 
DBS Group Holdings & Bank  2    Asia   Singapore 
Standard Bank Group Ltd.  2    Africa   South Africa 
Zurich Insurance Group   1    Europe   Switzerland 
BNY Mellon    1    North America  USA 
Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group 1    Asia   Japan 
AUS & NZ Banking Group Ltd.  1    Australia  Australia 
Erste Group Bank AG   1    Europe   Austria 
Sociéte Générale   1    Europe   France 
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ  1    Asia   Japan 
ING Group    1    Europe   Netherlands 
BNP Paribas    1    Europe   France 
UBS AG    1    Europe   Switzerland 
Crédit Suisse AG   1    Europe   Switzerland 
Deutsche Bank AG   1    Europe   Germany 
 
Board counsel 
American Enterprise Institute  other   North America  USA 
   
 	  
